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Equity analysts adjust GAAP earnings to report non-GAAP figures that they believe
better represent a firm’s current and future performance. The importance of such non-
GAAP(street) figures has been determined and accepted by the literature, but the process
in which analysts arrive at such figures is less understood. I apply a newly defined measure of
firm complexity using text based analysis of firm annual reports and investigate its effect.
When complexity increases, it becomes harder to individuate different components of a
system. When that system is a firm, complexity then increases the difficulty in determining
an accurate measure of performance. The effect of this type of firm characteristic on analysts
has yet to be explored. I find that firms with higher complexity exhibit a greater difference
between GAAP earnings and analyst adjusted non-GAAP earnings. A cross sectional test
featuring earnings volatility is also found to increase the marginal effect of complexity on
the difference. This suggests that firm complexity plays an important role in influencing an
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Publicly traded companies listed on exchanges within the United States are mandated by
the SEC to follow US GAAP financial reporting guidelines as issued by the FASB. However,
managers, financial analysts, individual investors, and other stakeholders are observed to
evaluate a company’s earnings performance through methods that in fact stray away from
GAAP rules. These methods are characterized by the exclusion of certain items from GAAP
earnings that are deemed nonrecurring or irrelevant to determining a firm’s true value. So-
called “non-GAAP” earnings have garnered a significant amount of literature investigating
it’s behavior, with the majority of studies centered around the role of firm management
and equity analysts in its definition. Management issues guidance and discloses non-GAAP
measures in their quarterly and annual reports in addition to required GAAP measures.
Analysts adjust GAAP earnings in their forecasts which are then consolidated by financial
data providers like I/B/E/S.
I will be focusing on the topic of non-GAAP earnings from the analyst standpoint. This
subsection of the non-GAAP literature has adopted the term “street earnings” to signify
equity analyst adjusted earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2007).
While prior research suggests the importance of street earnings to investors, the process
in which equity analysts exclude or include items from GAAP earnings to create street
earnings is less understood. I investigate the effects of certain predictor variables on the
magnitude of difference between GAAP and analyst adjusted street earnings. The first
of such predictor variables will be a text based measure of firm complexity as defined by
a 2020 paper by Loughran and McDonald. In addition to firm complexity, I will utilize
proxies of phenomena that have been found to have significant effect on the difference
between GAAP and street earnings from previous literature. These phenomena include
analyst ability, analyst incentive, management guidance (Gu and Chen 2004; Baik, Farber,
and Petroni 2009; Christensen et al. 2011). Although each variable has been investigated
separately, it is to my knowledge that a holistic study combining and controlling for all of
these hypotheses has not yet been attempted. Firm complexity measures a distinct and
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important characterization that is unique to each individual firm (Loughran and McDonald
2020). However, the measure itself has rarely been featured in literature due to inconsistent
definitions and difficulty in measurement. The usage of word count in an annual report
has been a relatively popular definition of firm complexity (Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2011;
Loughran and McDonald 2014; Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence 2017). Number of business
segments and the existence of foreign sales as given by Compustat has also been used as an
indicator of firm complexity (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007; Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins, and Lafond 2009; Cohen and Lou 2012). Other definitions include number
of XBRL segments, fractional percentage of intangible assets relative to total assets, and
derivative usage (R. Hoitash and U. Hoitash 2018; Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira 2007;
Chang, Donohoe, and Sougiannis 2016). The complexity measure that I will utilize is
a newly defined measure as created by Loughran and McDonald. In their 2020 paper,
Loughran and McDonald define a 374 word lexicon of words representative of complexity.
The number of unique complex word occurrences on a firm’s 10-K report is recorded and
normalized by the total number of complex words (374) to output a complexity score.
Efficacy of the complexity score is determined as it is found to be highly associated with a
firm’s audit fees, which itself is determined by the size of a firm and how complex the audit
will be.
Complex systems like firms are best understood as a collection of predictable compo-
nents. When the complexity of a system increases, it becomes more difficult to disentangle
one component from another. Since the interactions between different components of a
firm are unpredictable and chaotic, predictability becomes more challenging (Loughran and
McDonald 2020). This is the motivation to include firm complexity in the exploration of
analyst non-GAAP reporting. As complexity increases, the permanent and transient factors
of a firm’s earnings become harder to measure and may stray from defined GAAP systems.
Accordingly, I predict as my first hypothesis that equity analysts will be more likely to make
their own adjustments as to what consists of a firm’s true value as complexity increases, in-
creasing the difference between analyst-adjusted non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings.
In order to strengthen the potential findings of the relationship between complexity and
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difference, I also predict as my second hypothesis that for more volatile firms, complexity
will have a greater effect on the difference than for less volatile firms.
To test the effect of firm complexity on the differences in GAAP and equity analyst-
adjusted non-GAAP earnings, I will first define the difference in earnings measures as the
magnitude of the difference between IBES actual EPS (non-GAAP) and CapIQ diluted EPS
excluding extraordinary items (GAAP). Earnings data will come from these two data sources
for firms between the years 2000 and 2021, and feature firms that have been consistently a
component of the S&P 500 since 2000. The measure of complexity will not come directly
from Loughran and McDonald as the data they provide only features data up until 2018.
Instead, a self written scraping and parsing algorithm will collect the data following the
same conceptual background. Control variables from the aforementioned phenomena will
also be collected from various sources like CapIQ, IBES, and CRSP.
In a cluster-robust regression of complexity on the difference, we find that firms with
higher complexity do indeed exhibit a higher difference in earnings definitions. These re-
sults are enhanced by adding firm fixed effects and controlling for time based relationships
in creating dummy variables for each year. Although the significance of the relationship
between complexity and difference decreases, significance of the positive relationship is
maintained at the 5% level. With regards to the second hypothesis, an interesting pat-
tern emerges. Another regression with cluster robust standard errors is run with volatility
defined as either a continuous variable or a binary variable split on median volatility. In
both models, the individual volatility variable has a negative effect on difference. However,
the interaction term between complexity and volatility has a much larger positive effect.
The marginal effect of higher volatility is therefore positive as well, although it must be




Various aspects of equity analyst non-GAAP (street) earnings have been researched in past
literature. Researchers have first explored the importance of street earnings as a worth-
while metric for consideration. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) investigates the two alternative
definitions of earnings as GAAP earnings and street earnings. They find that there has
been a steady increase in the difference between the two earnings definitions since 1985.
Street earnings have been increasingly associated with stock prices while GAAP earnings
have declined in association, suggesting that the market put more weight on street earnings
definitions rather than GAAP earnings. Brown and Sivakumar (2003) structures a simi-
lar study comparing the value relevance of IBES street earnings versus Compustat GAAP
earnings. Street earnings are found to be more value relevant than GAAP earnings, echoing
the findings of Bradshaw and Sloan.
These studies have laid a firm groundwork for the apparent importance of street earnings.
However, the very process in which analysts make adjustments to GAAP earnings is not
entirely understood in the literature. Gu and Chen (2004) find that the items analysts
included in their earnings definitions, which are rolled up into the street earnings definition,
are more persistent than the items in which they exclude. Curiously, analysts were also
found to have excluded items which were evidently persistent and value relevant. This
suggests that analyst expertise serves as a factor for analysts to selectively elect inclusions
and exclusions of nonrecurring line items. Baik, Farber, and Petroni (2009) offers empirical
evidence for economic incentives influencing analyst’s decisions of inclusions and exclusions
by investigating glamour stocks. They find that analysts are more likely to exclude expense
items from earnings for these glamour stocks. Christensen et al. (2011) moves away from
analyst-centric predictors and investigates the role of management in the adjustment of
GAAP earnings by analysts. For firms whose management has issued specific earnings
guidance during the fiscal period, there is a much higher amount of incremental exclusion
by equity analysts.
In attempting to answer the question of how street earnings are determined, we can
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see that previous literature has focused on separate and distinct predictors. However, it is
unrealistic to assume that equity analysts are only ever influenced by one factor at a time.
In this paper I will seek not only to model out studied predictors as control variables, but
also new factors that would all work in conjunction in application.
3 Hypothesis
The role of an equity analyst is to determine the true value of a firm’s stock and predict
future financial performance by looking at and analyzing the financial data that a firm
provides. Financial modeling and forecasting is a liquid process that has no cookie cutter
template if done with care and expertise. This makes sense as all firms are constantly
changing, evolving, and reacting to certain developments and events. Looking at GAAP
earnings data as provided in 10-K documents, it exists as a more standardized figure created
from a given set of rules as defined by the FASB. However a common critique of GAAP is
that the rules maintain a picture of a firm that is too conservative. One such example of
GAAP conservatism is the phenomenon that large one time non-cash expenses are much
more prevalent in earnings calculations than one time non-cash gains (Heflin, Hsu, and Jin
2015). This results in firms experiencing negative income shocks due to transitory events
like impairments and restructuring charges. Thus one way for analysts to reach a “truer”
picture of firm performance and value is to make their own adjustments by excluding this
transitory information in GAAP financials which is deemed irrelevant to a firm’s future
performance. Research has indeed determined that these supplemental exclusions which
analysts elect are informative with value added (Gu and Chen 2004; Heflin, Hsu, and Jin
2015).
With regards to complexity, the lexicon of 374 of complexity words as compiled by
Loughran and McDonald seeks to include words that a reader of a firm’s annual report would
find to signal an increasing difficulty in forecasting future cash flows or creating audited
financial disclosures. As an example, if an annual report uses language that describes
leases, intangible assets, international operations, or acquisitions, forecasting the operating
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performance of a firm would prove to become more challenging (Loughran and McDonald
2020). The complexity lexicon was designed to take all of such cases into account when
determining the complexity score. When complexity is high, analysts would be more inclined
to look into this complexity and determine whether or not certain items as retained by
GAAP are representative of a firm’s true value. This serves as the motivation for my first
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more complex the firm, the larger the difference will be between
GAAP earnings and equity analyst adjusted non-GAAP earnings.
This hypothesis may not hold if this measure of complexity does not accurately deter-
mine the ”true” complexity of a firm. Although Loughran and McDonald have robustly
tested the efficacy of such a measure, there is no direct test which verifies the relationship
between complexity as defined by the 374 word lexicon versus the indicators that equity
analysts are attuned to like impairments and restructuring charges. Another reason is that
even if the complexity measure functions as intended, equity analysts may instead stick to
GAAP earnings when complexity is high. Similarly to how equity analysts are more likely
to exclude when management issues guidance, high complexity may be cautionary signal to
stick to a more conservative outlook on firm performance.
3.1 Earnings Volatility
In order to further investigate the relationship between complexity and the difference in
earnings definitions, I will be conducting a cross-sectional test featuring earnings volatility.
A widely held belief among management is that earnings volatility is negatively related to
the predictability of a firm’s future earnings (Dichev and Tang 2009). This means that if
the standard deviation of a firm’s earnings is higher, it will be harder to determine how
that firm will perform in the future. Considering how I expect complexity to exhibit the
same behavior, the interaction between volatility and complexity should then increase that
effect. This serves as the motivation for my second hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The marginal effect of complexity on the difference in earnings def-
initions will be more pronounced in firms with high earnings volatility compared to firms
with low earnings volatility.
A concern for this hypothesis is that volatility itself might have and inverse relationship
to difference in earnings definitions. Considering earnings volatility as a singular predictor,
equity analysts may stick closer to GAAP earnings due to the wild swings in earnings that
is expected of volatile firms.
4 Data
Earnings and predictor data was collected for S&P 500 component companies with a sample
period spanning from the start of 2000 until the beginning of March 2021. However, since
the component list of S&P 500 companies is subject to constant change, I have restricted
the sample data set to only include firms that have been a component company since the
start of the sampling period, and have continued to stay as a component until the date
that I collected the data. This ensures that for each firm included there is continuity in the
data. Out of 505 current S&P 500 component companies, only 201 remained after filtering.1
Figure 1 shows the distribution of industry sectors for the firms that have remained.
4.1 Difference in Earnings
GAAP earnings are defined as diluted earnings per share excluding extraordinary items
as given by S&P Capital IQ Financials. While the vast majority of non-GAAP literature
has featured Compustat as the GAAP data provider of choice, I use CapIQ Financials
specifically as a more accurate measure of the information that equity analysts interact
with. Data collection for Capital IQ Financials is facilitated by the use of the Excel add-on.
With 201 component companies spanning 22 years, the CapIQ financials dataset contains
4422 observations. It must be noted however that many firms have not reached their fiscal
year end for 2021, so the vast majority of 2021 data is missing.
1Historical S&P 500 component data collected from: https://github.com/fja05680/sp500
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Figure 1: Distribution of Industry Sectors
Analyst non-GAAP earnings is defined using I/B/E/S “Actuals” EPS accessed using
WRDS. The I/B/E/S actual value for a given firm in a given year represents the earnings
per share value after adjustments as defined by the majority of equity analysts. The data
contains 3958 observations.
In order to create the difference variable, both CapIQ GAAP EPS and I/B/E/S non-
GAAP EPS are first deflated by the last sale price on the fiscal year end date to give
a market cap adjusted measure of firm earnings. The difference value is then defined as
follows:
diff = abs(eps ibes − eps ciq)
Here we take the magnitude of the difference since we are only worried about if there is
a difference present between the two measures, not if the difference is positive or negative.
These differences are then winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of
extreme outliers.
4.2 Complexity
Although I am referencing the Loughran and McDonald paper on text based firm complex-
ity, I will not be directly using their figures as reported from their findings. The mechanics
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of returning the variable complexity will be the same conceptually, but different procedu-
rally. Like Loughran and McDonald, I will be using the same 374 word complexity lexicon.
However, the way in which each 10-K document is parsed to look for the complexity words
is marginally different. An algorithm is run to first scrape through the SEC EDGAR web
fillings to retrieve the files of choice for the 201 S&P 500 component companies. After a
10-K file is located, I run a text parsing algorithm to extract all human readable text from
the document. A number of companies store a significant portion of their MD&A section
in Exhibit 13 of a separate annual report, so for such companies Exhibit 13 is also parsed.
With this parsed text, a complexity score can be calculated by dividing the number of




unique complex word occurrences
length of the complexity lexicon
Therefore, each complexity value represents the percentage of complex words from the
complexity lexicon that exist within the human readable text of a 10-K document.
Due to the limitations of EDGAR, this algorithm was run for firms that filed their
documents starting from 2001, and all the way until present day. Original Loughran and
McDonald figures were only run until 2018. There are minimal differences between the
complexity values, so all complexity values in this study will originate from my algorithms
for consistency. Some manual cleaning was also required. For example, Clorox Co filed their
2003q2 10-Q as a 10-K file, which was treated as a 10-K file in the algorithm. Irregularities
in fiscal year period end corresponding with leap year characteristics also required manual
cleaning. See Appendix 7.1 for the complexity data.
4.3 Base Sample
For the base regression, we end up with a sample of 3,658 observations featuring 200 firms.
In this sample, most years are populated with close to 200 firm observations, which the
exception of 2000 and 2020 (see Appendix 7.3). The cause of data loss in 2000 is due to the
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complexity measure and the usage of SEC EDGAR. For fillings submitted before 2001 on
EDGAR, there is no consistent working method to access 10-K information. Therefore, the
remaining 84 firms are firms with 2000 fiscal year ends who have filed their reports in 2001.
For the data loss in 2020, the main reason is the lack of population of I/B/E/S actuals
earnings data for firms. Since data was collect on March 15 of 2021, many firms have yet
to file for their 2020 fiscal year end. From a industry sector breakdown we see that there is
an representation of firms that is heavily weighted towards Financials and Industrials. This
is mostly due to the fact that I have only kept firms in the sample that have been a S&P
500 component since the start of 2000. Table 1 shows the process of sample selection for
the base regression and where observations and firms are lost.
Table 1: Sample Selection for Base Regression
Sample Selection Observations Firms
Starting annual observations for 201 firms for 22 years (2000-2021) 4,422 201
Observations after removing missing I/B/E/S earnings (defined as of March 15, 2021) 3,951 201
Observations with price data 3,930 200
Observations with complexity data 3,658 200
Table 2 displays the summary statistics for the variables that are included in the base
regression. On average, eps ibes is 0.056 while eps ciq is 0.040. This is expected as equity
analyst adjusted earnings will paint a more optimistic picture of earnings than GAAP.
GAAP earnings does have more variability, as standard deviation is higher for eps ciq at
0.384 compared to eps ibes at 0.221. We then see that the average diff is relatively the
difference of the average earnings definitions. On average, complexity is 0.269, which means
that 26.9 percent of complexity words from the complexity lexicon are used in a 10-K
document.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Base Regression
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
eps ibes 3,658 0.056 0.221 −12.682 0.047 0.076 0.330
eps ciq 3,658 0.040 0.384 −22.429 0.038 0.070 0.487
complexity 3,658 0.269 0.052 0.061 0.233 0.305 0.404
diff 3,658 0.016 0.033 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.226
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4.4 Control Variables
Four control variables are collected to be included in the regression.
The first control variable is firm size as determined by the market capitalization for a
given firm at a given period end date. Market cap data is collected from CapIQ financials
the same way that GAAP EPS is collected. The market cap figure is logged to achieve a
more normally distributed distribution.
The second control variable relates to the phenomenon in which managers play an active
role in influencing the composition of street earnings via earnings guidance (Christensen et
al. 2011). To control for such a relationship, I collect guidance data from CapIQ financials
as a dummy variable. If management has issued earnings guidance in a given year, the
guidance variable equals 1. If not, the guidance variable equals 0.
The third control variable relates to the phenomenon in which analyst expertise affects
the adjustments that are made to GAAP earnings (Gu and Chen 2004). To control for
analyst expertise, I utilize the Detail History file of I/B/E/S which includes analyst codes.
Keeping track of the number of years that a specific analyst code has issued an earnings
forecast since the beginning of I/B/E/S data availability, I can calculate the average analyst
experience for a given firm in a given year. Average analyst experience is then winsorized
at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of extreme outliers.
The last control variable relates to the phenomenon that analysts covering firms with
glamour stock status will be more motivated to exclude items from GAAP earnings to paint
a better picture of future performance. To control for glamour stock status, I will utilize
a measure of stock turnover following previous literature (Baik, Farber, and Petroni 2009).
That is:
turnover =
average monthly trading volume
number of shares outstanding
Trading volume and shares outstanding data are both collected from CRSP on WRDS.
The turnover figure is also logged to achieve a more normally distributed distribution.
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4.5 Control Sample
For the regression with control variables included, there is data attrition due to missing
data in a given control variable. In the I/B/E/S data, there were 12 observations where
analyst experience could not be calculated and returned an N/A Value. When including
the turnover figure from CRSP, one firm returns no information is therefore is omitted.
Volatility data is also included in this table, although we use it in the cross-sectional test.
The loss of one observation is due to the one firm only having one observation in the data,
leading to an N/A standard deviation calculation. Table 3 shows the process of sample
selection for the control and cross-sectional regression and where observations and firms are
lost.
Table 3: Sample Selection for Control Regression
Sample Selection Observations Firms
Starting observations from base regression 3,658 200
Observations with analyst experience figure 3,646 200
Observations with turnover figure 3,640 199
Observations with earnings volatility figure. (One firm with only one observation) 3,639 198
Table 4 displays the summary statistics for new variables that are introduced in the
control regression, in addition to the variables that are included in the base regression. The
number of observations has decreased, which slightly changes the summary statistics for
those variables included in the base regression. However the overarching relationships and
behaviors of eps figures, complexity, and diff stay the same. The logged market cap has a
average of 10.080 with a standard deviation of 1.128. Guidance has a mean of 0.585, which
means that on average firm management issues guidance 58.5% of the time. The average
experience for equity analysts covering a firm is 9.751 years with a standard deviation of
2.757. The logged turnover value has an average of 0.358 and is quite variable with a
standard deviation of 0.542.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Control Regression
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
eps ibes 3,640 0.057 0.221 −12.682 0.047 0.076 0.330
eps ciq 3,640 0.040 0.385 −22.429 0.038 0.070 0.487
diff 3,640 0.016 0.033 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.228
complexity 3,640 0.269 0.052 0.061 0.233 0.305 0.404
lmk cap 3,640 10.080 1.128 6.925 9.296 10.777 14.468
guidance 3,640 0.585 0.493 0 0 1 1
avg exp 3,640 9.751 2.757 3.980 7.770 11.528 16.926
lturnover 3,640 0.358 0.542 −1.740 −0.013 0.688 3.368
5 Results
5.1 Correlation
Table 5 provides both the Spearman correlations and Pearson correlations of the variables
included in the regression. Consistent with my expectations and hypothesis, complexity is
positively correlated both linearly and monotonically with the difference in earnings defi-
nitions. Logged market cap is negatively correlated with the difference. This correlation
is much more significant linearly than monotonically. Guidance has no linear correlation
to the difference, but it will change along with the difference together although not at the
same rate. Both analyst experience and logged turnover also show a positive correlation to
the difference at highly significant levels.
Table 5: Spearman(Pearson) Correlations above(below) diagonal
diff complexity lmk cap guidance avg exp lturnover
diff 0.31**** -0.04* 0.05** 0.10**** 0.07****
complexity 0.19**** 0.22**** 0.12**** 0.22**** 0.07****
lmk cap -0.12**** 0.22**** 0.17**** 0.15**** -0.36****
guidance 0.00 0.12**** 0.16**** 0.18**** 0.12****
avg exp 0.06*** 0.24**** 0.15**** 0.17**** -0.07****
lturnover 0.18**** 0.10**** -0.37**** 0.10**** -0.08****
∗∗∗∗p < 0.0001; ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
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5.2 Regression
The equation of the base regression in Model 1 is as follows:
diffi,t = β0 + β1complexityi,t + εi,t
I then control for previously studied phenomenon of guidance, analyst experience, and
glamour status in Model 2 with the regression equation below:
diffi,t = β0+β1complexityi,t+β2lmk capi,t+β3guidancei,t+β4avg expi,t+β5lturnoveri,t+εi,t
Introducing firm fixed effects in Model 3:
diffi,t = β1complexityi,t + β2lmk capi,t + β3guidancei,t
+ β4avg expi,t + β5lturnoveri,t + firmfixedeffectsi + εi,t
And introducing year dummy variables in Model 4:
diffi,t = β1complexityi,t + β2lmk capi,t + β3guidancei,t
+ β4avg expi,t + β5lturnoveri,t + β6−25dummy(t) + firmfixedeffectsi + εi,t
Table 6 features the regression output for these four models.
In the base regression of Model 1, the complexity coefficient is statistically significant
at the 0.1 percent level with a value of 0.1203. An increase in complexity by 1 percent
increases the magnitude of difference in price deflated earnings definitions by 0.0012. Al-
though this value means little in the practical sense, it gives a solid baseline that complexity
does positively affect the diff as our first hypothesis predicts. To determine a practical
significance, one standard deviation increase in complexity (0.052) increases diff by 0.0063
(0.052 ∗ 0.1203). This is a 19 percent (0.0063/0.033) increase in the standard deviation of
diff. Here the R2 value is low at 0.0353, so there is a lot of unexplained variation left over.
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Table 6: Model 1 is a cluster robust linear regression between complexity and diff. Model 2
features the introduction of control variables. Model 3 introduces firm fixed effects. Model
4 introduces year dummy variables to control for time trends.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −0.0161∗∗ 0.0097
(0.0051) (0.0107)
complexity 0.1203∗∗∗ 0.1248∗∗∗ 0.1132∗∗ 0.1022∗
(0.0203) (0.0206) (0.0351) (0.0439)
lmk cap −0.0033∗∗ −0.0129∗∗∗ −0.0168∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0028)
guidance −0.0017 0.0002 −0.0002
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011)
avg exp 0.0005 0.0012∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
lturnover 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0034)
R2 0.0353 0.0761 0.3229 0.3516
Adj. R2 0.0350 0.0749 0.2829 0.3093
Num. obs. 3658 3640 3640 3640
RMSE 0.0326 0.0320 0.0282 0.0277
N Clusters 200 199 199 199
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
In Model 2, complexity maintains statistical significance at the 0.1 percent level with
a coefficient of 0.1248. With the control variables added into the regression equation,
the effect of complexity on diff actually increases. One standard deviation increase in
complexity increases diff by 0.0065 (0.052 ∗ 0.1248), or 20 percent (0.0065/0.033) of its
standard deviation. Two out of the four control variables are also statistically significant.
An increase in lmk cap by 1 decreases diff by 0.0033, with this effect reaching statistically
significance at the 1 percent level. Glamour stock status as proxied by lturnover increases
diff by 0.008 and is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. Guidance has a negative
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effect on diff and avg exp has a positive effect on diff, but both of these variables are not
statistically significant. This model still does a poor job of explaining our independent
variable of diff with an R2 value of only 0.0761.
By introducing firm fixed effects in Model 3, the time invariant characteristics across
firms are controlled for. With this model, complexity is still statistically significant al-
though at the lower 1 percent level. The coefficient has also decreased to 0.1132. To
consider practical significance, one standard deviation increase in complexity increases diff
by 0.0059 (0.052 ∗ 0.1132), or 18 percent of its standard deviation (0.0059/0.033). Lmk cap
and lturnover maintain their statistical significance with coefficients of -0.0129 and 0.0092,
respectively. With firm fixed effects analyst experience avg exp also becomes statistically
significant at the 1 percent level with a coefficient of 0.0012. The effect of guidance on diff
becomes positive, but still statistically insignificant. With firm fixed effects, the R2 value
jumps to 0.3229, meaning that about a third of the unexplained variation is explained by
our model.
Finally to account and control for time trends, 20 year dummy variables from 2000 to
2019 are included in the model. These variables are not shown in the regression output
of Table 6 in consideration of spacing, but can be found in Appendix 7.2. With time
trends controlled for, the statistical significance of complexity still holds, but decreases to
the 5 percent level. The coefficient also decreases again to 0.1022. One standard deviation
increase in complexity increases diff by 0.0053 (0.052∗0.1022), or 16 percent (0.0053/0.033)
of its standard deviation. Lmk cap is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level with
a coefficient of -0.0168. Lturnover is statistically significant at the 1 percent level with
a coefficient of 0.0111. The effects of guidance and avg exp become miniscule with no
statistical significance. We end with an R2 value of 0.3516 meaning some of the unexplained
variation was indeed picked up by the year dummy variables.
Through these four models, Hypothesis 1 is affirmed. The higher a firm’s complexity
is, the larger the difference will be between GAAP earnings and equity analyst adjusted
non-GAAP earnings. This relationship is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in




In the cross sectional test, I include the continuous firm earnings volatility variable in Model
1. Since volaility is fixed for each firm, the regression is run without firm fixed effects as
given by the following equation:
diffi,t = β1complexityi,t + β2lmk capi,t + β3guidancei,t + β4avg expi,t
+ β5lturnoveri,t + β6−25dummy(t) + β26voli + β27voli ∗ complexityi,t + εi,t
In Model 2, I instead use the binary volatility variable split into high and low volatility
by median volatility. Like the previous model, the regression is run without firm fixed
effects.
diffi,t = β1complexityi,t + β2lmk capi,t + β3guidancei,t + β4avg expi,t
+ β5lturnoveri,t + β6−25dummy(t) + β26vol bini + β27vol bini ∗ complexityi,t + εi,t
Table 7 features the regression output for these two models. Most specifically I will focus
on the effects of vol, vol bin, and their interaction terms with complexity. In Model 1 the
individual volatility variable has a coefficient of -0.0555 but is not statistically significant.
However when it is interacted with complexity, the coefficient becomes positive at 0.4455
and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Model 2 shares the same behavior. The
binary volatility variable has a negative relationship with a coefficient of -0.0105 and is not
statistically significant. When interacted with complexity, the coefficient is 0.0768 and is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Complexity and lmk cap remain statistically
significant at the 0.1 percent level in these models.
Marginally, this means that a 1 percent increase in complexity will increase diff by
0.00155 (0.00078 + 0.00077) for high volatility firms compared to 0.00078 (0.00078 + 0)
for low volatility firms. Practically, one standard deviation increase in complexity when
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Adj. R2 0.1469 0.1182
Num. obs. 3639 3639
RMSE 0.0308 0.0313
N Clusters 198 198
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Table 7: Cross Sectional Test Models
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volatility is high increases diff by 0.008 ((0.0778∗0.052)+(0.0768∗0.052∗1)), or 24 percent
(0.008/0.033) of its standard deviation. When volatility is low, one standard deviation
increase in complexity increases diff by 0.004 (0.0778 ∗ 0.052), or 12 percent (0.004/0.033)
of it’s standard deviation. High volatility doubles the practical effect of complexity on diff.
The findings of these models affirms Hypothesis 2. The effect of complexity on diff is
higher in firms with high earnings volatility compared to firms with low earnings volatility.
This cross-sectional test serves to strengthen the relationship between complexity and diff.
6 Conclusion
US GAAP is a standardized set of rules which seeks to improve the clarity, consistency, and
comparability of financial information. As such, all publicly traded companies listed on an
exchange within the United States are mandated to follow GAAP reporting guidelines in
their financial reports. However, there are many groups and individuals who look to report
firm earnings in a way that differs from GAAP. One of such groups is equity analysts,
who report adjusted non-GAAP earnings (street earnings) measures that they feel better
represent the true conditions of a firm. Previous literature has readily established the
importance of analyst adjusted non-GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Brown and
Sivakumar 2003). Although the literature has also found phenomenon that have affected
the determination of these earnings (Gu and Chen 2004; Baik, Farber, and Petroni 2009;
Christensen et al. 2011), the process is still obscure and less understood.
In order to better understand this process, I introduce a text based measure of firm
complexity as defined by Loughran and McDonald (2020). Complexity is calculated as the
percentage of unique occurrences of complexity indicating words in a certain 10-K document
to a complete lexicon of 374 complexity indicating words. As complexity increases, the
harder it becomes to disentangle the interactions between different parts of a firm, therefore
decreasing clarity and predictability. Given this conceptual background, it is expected that
equity analysts will face complexity in the process of determining their non-GAAP figures.
The results of my models show that complexity does indeed have a significantly positive
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effect on the difference between equity analyst non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings.
That is, if the complexity for a firm is high, analysts are more likely to restate GAAP
earnings figures with their own figures. This relationship is strengthened by a cross sectional
test with earnings volatility, as the marginal effects when considering the interaction between
complexity and volatility increases the difference furthermore.
Since this measure of complexity was only just recently defined, this thesis is one of
the first applications to my knowledge. This has implications for future research as a
new readily defined variable that can be used in other contexts. Text based analysis like
the complexity measure in this study are a precursor to the field that is natural language
processing. The current complexity measure relies on human based decisions to create the
374 word complexity lexicon which can lead to a misrepresentation of ”true” complexity.
Although it surpassed it scope of this study, using machine natural language processing
could provide a more objective definition of complexity. The problem to tackle then would
be to accurately create a set of training data as complexity itself does not have an objective
measure. I do believe that with time even more sophisticated measures of such phenomenon




Find complexity data here at: https://github.com/chenpatrickc/thesisdata
7.2 Additional Regression Output
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −0.0161∗∗ 0.0097
(0.0051) (0.0107)
complexity 0.1203∗∗∗ 0.1248∗∗∗ 0.1132∗∗ 0.1022∗
(0.0203) (0.0206) (0.0351) (0.0439)
lmk cap −0.0033∗∗ −0.0129∗∗∗ −0.0168∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0028)
guidance −0.0017 0.0002 −0.0002
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011)
avg exp 0.0005 0.0012∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)












































R2 0.0353 0.0761 0.3229 0.3516
Adj. R2 0.0350 0.0749 0.2829 0.3093
Num. obs. 3658 3640 3640 3640
RMSE 0.0326 0.0320 0.0282 0.0277
N Clusters 200 199 199 199
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
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7.3 Observation Frequency Tables
Year n prop
1 2000 83 0.02
2 2001 113 0.03
3 2002 178 0.05
4 2003 178 0.05
5 2004 180 0.05
6 2005 181 0.05
7 2006 185 0.05
8 2007 188 0.05
9 2008 188 0.05
10 2009 190 0.05
11 2010 188 0.05
12 2011 192 0.05
13 2012 194 0.05
14 2013 191 0.05
15 2014 187 0.05
16 2015 194 0.05
17 2016 195 0.05
18 2017 195 0.05
19 2018 196 0.05
20 2019 199 0.05
21 2020 45 0.01
Table 9: Frequency tables of observations by year
Sector n prop
1 Communication Services 81 0.02
2 Consumer Discretionary 420 0.12
3 Consumer Staples 350 0.10
4 Energy 187 0.05
5 Financials 625 0.17
6 Health Care 355 0.10
7 Industrials 560 0.15
8 Information Technology 413 0.11
9 Materials 260 0.07
10 Real Estate 19 0.01
11 Utilities 370 0.10
Table 10: Frequency tables of observations by sector
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